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COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM: NEVADA’S 
INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS AND THE ROLE 
OF FEDERAL COURTS IN PROTECTING THE 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN NON-CAPITAL 
CASES 
Randolph Fiedler,∗ Megan Hoffman,† and Jonathan 
Kirshbaum‡ 
In Martinez v. Ryan, the United States Supreme Court held the ineffective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel, or the lack of representation in a state 
post-conviction proceeding, provides cause to allow a federal habeas petitioner 
to overcome a procedural default on an ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim.1 This represented a radical shift in the criminal justice system. Prior to 
Martinez, state post-conviction proceedings—the typical mechanism for a 
criminal defendant to challenge the performance of his trial attorney—were not 
heavily scrutinized. It was understood and accepted that defendants did not 
have the right to counsel in these post-conviction proceedings. Whether a de-
fendant represented himself in the state post-conviction proceedings or had 
counsel to assist him, federal review was strictly limited to those claims raised 
in that proceeding, regardless of how well they were investigated or presented.  
However, Martinez has now altered that calculus and, in doing so, shined a 
bright spotlight on whether these state post-convictions proceedings adequately 
protect a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme 
Court explained why this is so important: “[T]he right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system . . . . Indeed, 
the right to counsel is the foundation for our adversary system.”2 In light of 
Martinez, a criminal defendant now has a broader mechanism for protecting 
this fundamental constitutional right. A defendant can raise new challenges to 
                                                        
∗  Randolph Fiedler is an Assistant Federal Public Defender for the District of Nevada in the 
Capital Habeas Unit. 
†  Megan Hoffman is the Chief of the Non-Capital Habeas Unit with the Federal Public De-
fender for the District of Nevada. 
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1  Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). 
2  Id. at 12. 
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his attorney’s performance in a federal habeas proceeding and argue that what 
occurred in the state post-conviction proceedings was inadequate. 
Martinez’s impact in non-capital cases in Nevada could be quite signifi-
cant. The need for vigorous post-conviction review in Nevada is hard to deny. 
There have been systematic problems in the indigent defense system that con-
tinue to this day. Despite these nearly intractable issues, the Nevada Supreme 
Court refused to extend Martinez to its own state post-conviction process.3 Ra-
ther, the court chose to elevate the concept of finality of the conviction over 
rigorous protection of this invaluable constitutional right. It is this cramped vi-
sion of post-conviction review that Martinez was clearly meant to address.  
I.   SYSTEMATIC ISSUES IN NEVADA’S INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 
Nevada boasts a strong yet complicated history with indigent defense. As 
early as 1875, Nevada became the first state in the country to authorize the ap-
pointment of counsel to indigent defendants in all criminal cases.4 It was not 
until 1971, however, that the Nevada State Legislature created the State Public 
Defender.5 
Today, Nevada’s statutes require that counties create their own public de-
fender office if the county’s population exceeds “100,000 or more.”6 Clark and 
Washoe counties are the only counties that fall under this requirement. In the 
remaining Nevada counties, the counties themselves have discretion to deter-
mine the nature of their indigent defense services. They may choose, for exam-
ple, to contract with the Nevada State Public Defender. They may decide to 
create their own county public defender office, as Elko has. Or they may—as 
the majority of the rural counties have opted to do—have private attorneys con-
tract with the county to provide all indigent defense services.7 Under any of 
these scenarios, however, Nevada's counties are responsible for paying for 
nearly all of the indigent defense service costs with the state contributing very 
little.8  
Although Nevada has demonstrated a long history of commitment to indi-
gent defense, the state’s indigent defense system continues to face significant 
challenges. In 2007, the Nevada Supreme Court created the Indigent Defense 
Commission, following several damning reports on the quality of indigent de-
fense services in Nevada.9 The court created the commission “in response to 
[its] concerns about the current processes for providing indigent defendants . . . 
                                                        
3  Brown v. McDaniel, 331 P.3d 867 (Nev. 2014). 
4  Karin L. Kreizenbeck, The Sixth Amendment in Nevada, NEV. LAW. 46 (Oct. 2015). 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 180.010 (1971). 
6  NEV. REV. STAT. § 260.010 (2016). 
7  See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 260. 
8  Nevada, GIDEONAT50, gideonat50.org/in-your-state/nevada [https://perma.cc/2PNJ-HPQ 
K] (last visited Apr. 13, 2017). 
9  Order Establishing Study Committee on Representation of Indigent Defendants, In re Re-
view of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile 
Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. Apr. 26, 2007). 
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with counsel and whether the attorneys appointed are providing quality and ef-
fective representation.”10 Several incidents demonstrate the need for the com-
mission’s work.  
First, in 1997 the Nevada Supreme Court Task Force for the Study of Ra-
cial and Economic Bias in the Justice System (“Task Force”) issued its final 
report.11 The report concluded the failure to adequately fund and staff the pub-
lic defender and court interpreter systems resulted in unequal representation.12 
In particular, the Task Force noted the high caseloads maintained by public de-
fenders, a lack of investigators to prepare a case for trial, that defendants were 
only able to spend two to three hours total with their public defenders over the 
course of the case, a lack of training, and a pressure to plea bargain preempted 
the ability to effectively represent indigent defendants.13 The Task Force rec-
ommended guaranteeing the right to effective assistance of counsel at all stages 
of the proceedings, including post-conviction.14 
Second, in 2000, the Spangenberg Group completed its review of indigent 
defense services in several of Nevada counties.15 The Group’s report noted a 
stark lack of data reporting throughout counties in the state.16 Further compli-
cating the provision of effective indigent defense services are Nevada’s distinct 
demographics: the report observed that Nevada has a small population (alt-
hough centered around urban cores in Clark and Washoe counties), and a large 
geographic size. “Thus, the indigent defense systems in the state have charac-
teristics that can be compared to both small, densely-populated Eastern states 
and large, more sparsely populated, rural mid-Western and Western states.”17  
The report concluded the Nevada “State Public Defender System is in Cri-
sis.”18 In so finding, the report observed a lack of independence in the defense 
function throughout Nevada, a lack of accountability and oversight of the quali-
ty of indigent defense, unmanageable workloads of public defenders, a lack of 
“comprehensive, reliable indigent defense data,” and anecdotal evidence that 
“racial bias exists in the criminal justice system.”19 The report urged Nevada to 
assume its fair share of the burden to provide for quality indigent defense ser-
vices, to establish an Indigent Defense Commission, to create an intermediate 
                                                        
10  Id. at 1. 
11  Nevada Supreme Court Task Force for the Study of Racial and Economic Bias in the Jus-
tice System: Findings and Recommendations, In re Establishment of the Nevada Supreme 
Court Task Force for the Study of Racial and Economic Bias in the Justice System, ADKT 
No. 160 (Nev. June 18, 1997) [hereinafter Final Report: Findings and Recommendations]. 
12  Id. at 64. 
13  Id. at 65–67. 
14  Id. at 67. 
15  SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE STATE OF NEVADA: FINDINGS 
& RECOMMENDATIONS 2–3 (2000), http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/nv_tsgindigent 
defensereport_dec2000.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJX5-9MK6]. 
16  Id. at 19. 
17  Id. at 23. 
18  Id. at 71. 
19  Id.at 71–78. 
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appellate court, to create a plan to evaluate indigent defense providers on a reg-
ular basis.20 
Finally, in 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in 
Miranda v. Clark County.21 Before the appeal, Roberto Miranda’s capital mur-
der conviction was overturned on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Miranda then filed a § 1983 action22 in which he complained of two particular 
policies at the Clark County Public Defender’s Office.23 First was a policy of 
administering lie detector tests to all defendants, including non-capital cases. If 
the defendant failed the polygraph, he was presumed guilty and minimal re-
sources were expended on the case, including investigation.24 Second was a 
policy to assign brand-new lawyers to capital cases without providing training 
or experience beforehand.25 The Ninth Circuit concluded both policies created 
“a policy of deliberate indifference to the requirement that every criminal de-
fendant receive adequate representation, regardless of innocence or guilt.”26 
Since its creation in 2007, the Indigent Defense Commission has taken 
great strides to improve the quality of indigent defense services in Nevada. In 
2008, the Nevada Indigent Defense Standards of Performance were implement-
ed.27 Other recommendations have been adopted, such as altering the payment 
methods for contract attorneys and supporting legislation to shift some of the 
cost from the counties to the state.28 There have also been some moderate im-
provements in institutional public defender systems, such as decreased case-
loads and relatively higher resources. 
 Despite these improvements, “[s]erious problems exist today in rural Ne-
vada” with the quality of indigent defense representation.29 The Sixth Amend-
ment Center noted these problems include a woeful lack of financial resources, 
“a lack of attorneys to do the work, the geographic expanse of most rural coun-
ties, and limited infrastructure to train and evaluate attorneys.”30 As a result of 
its review of the current state of Nevada's indigent defense systems, the Sixth 
Amendment Center recommended that the state establish a permanent “state-
funded public defender commission.”31  
 Yet, while there is hope for future improvements, these reports and com-
missions cannot undo the deleterious impact the systemic problems in Nevada 
                                                        
20  Id. at 78–84. 
21  Miranda v. Clark County, 19 F.3d 465 (9th Cir. 2003). 
22  42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (civil action for deprivation of rights). 
23  Miranda, 19 F.3d at 465. 
24  Id. at 467, 469–70. 
25  Id. at 471. 
26  Id. at 470–71. 
27  Order, In re Review of Issues Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Crim-
inal and Juvenile Delinquency Cases, ADKT No. 411 (Nev. July 23, 2015). 
28  Id. at 1–2. 
29  SIXTH AMEND. CTR., RECLAIMING JUSTICE iii (2013), http://sixthamendment.org/6ac/nvrep 
ort_reclaimingjustice_032013.pdf [https://perma.cc/TH6E-SZAR]. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 35. 
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have had on the quality of representation going on many years now. Unfortu-
nately, Nevada’s available mechanism for vindicating this right—the post-
conviction process—is woefully inadequate. 
II.   NEVADA’S POST-CONVICTION PROCESS IN NON-CAPITAL CASES 
Nevada’s post-conviction process for non-capital cases is set forth in Chap-
ter 34 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. This set of statutes imposes strict limita-
tions on a defendant’s ability to pursue a post-conviction habeas petition in 
state court. For example, a habeas petition must be dismissed if it is not filed 
within one year after the Nevada Supreme Court issues its remittitur on a time-
ly filed direct appeal.32 Further, every claim has to be brought in a single peti-
tion. Claims brought in a second or successive petition have to be dismissed, 
whether they were raised before or not.33 These procedural bars are mandato-
ry.34 A petitioner can only overcome these procedural bars through a showing 
of “good cause” and prejudice or that he is actually innocent.35 
These rules are tough and unforgiving. And that was the legislature’s 
goal—to provide only one time through the post-conviction system. The Neva-
da Supreme Court has stated the process was “designed to streamline the post-
conviction review process and ensure the finality of judgments of convictions” 
while leaving open only “a safety valve” for review in extremely limited cir-
cumstances.36 
With these strict rules in place, the question becomes whether these proce-
dures are adequate to protect a defendant’s right to counsel in non-capital cases. 
Nevada, like most states, requires a defendant to raise ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in a post-conviction petition. These claims typically require 
fact-development and inquiries into strategy that are outside the record on di-
rect appeal.37 But as the High Court recognized in Martinez, pro se incarcerated 
defendants are generally not in a position to conduct the necessary investigation 
and do not have the legal experience or wisdom to adequately present these 
claims.38 
Despite calls for effective representation of litigants in post-conviction 
proceedings,39 the appointment of counsel to assist defendants with ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims in non-capital cases remains discretionary.40 As a 
                                                        
32  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.726(1) (2016). If no timely appeal was filed, then a petitioner only 
has one year from the entry of the judgment of conviction to file his post-conviction petition. 
Id. 
33  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.810. 
34  Pellegrini v. State, 34 P.3d 519, 536 (Nev. 2001). 
35  Id. at 537. 
36  Brown v. McDaniel, 331 P.3d 867, 874 (Nev. 2014). 
37  Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 11 (2012). 
38  Id. at 11–12. 
39  Final Report: Findings and Recommendations, supra note 11, at 67. 
40  NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.750 (2016). In contrast, appointment of counsel is required for a 
capital petitioner’s first petition. NEV. REV. STAT. § 34.820(1)(a). Because it is a statutory 
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result, many petitioners are left on their own to raise ineffectiveness claims 
without the real ability to properly plead them.  
But even in the situations where counsel is appointed, there is no guarantee 
the attorney will do a sufficient job on the post-conviction petition to adequate-
ly protect the petitioner’s rights. Because counsel in these proceedings is nei-
ther a constitutional nor statutory right, a petitioner has no right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.41 Although no comprehensive review of attorney perfor-
mance has been done in these proceedings, recent decisions from the Ninth 
Circuit indicate that some post-conviction counsel in Nevada do not perform at 
a reasonably competent level.42 
That is the goal of Martinez—to remedy this black hole in the process. But 
the underlying policy rationales of Martinez could easily extend to the state 
court’s own processes. In other words, should the state courts extend the hold-
ing of Martinez to allow a non-capital petitioner to assert ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel as a ground for cause in a second or successive post-
conviction petition? 
In Brown v. McDaniel,43 the Nevada Supreme Court answered with a re-
sounding “No.” They acknowledged what was at stake with their negative re-
sponse: a non-capital petitioner would be given an opportunity to obtain federal 
merits review of a procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
claim.44 The court stated it was willing to accept that risk. And the court put it 
in blunt terms. The main goal of its post-conviction proceedings was not to en-
sure the state courts were provided an opportunity to resolve all constitutional 
claims.45 Rather, the true function of its system was to provide a streamlined 
process for post-conviction review in order to ensure the State’s “interest in fi-
nality that animates the statutory habeas remedy and its procedural bars.”46 
The upshot of Brown is the post-conviction proceedings in non-capital cas-
es remain an inadequate remedy for vindicating the right to counsel. Many peti-
                                                                                                                                 
right, the Nevada Supreme Court has held that a capital petitioner is entitled to the effective 
assistance of post-conviction counsel on the first petition. Crump v. Warden, 934 P.2d 247, 
253 (Nev. 1997). 
41  See Brown, 331 P.3d at 870. 
42  For example, in Gibbs v. Legrand, post-conviction counsel erroneously told the petitioner 
that his time for filing for post-conviction relief had not started. Gibbs v. Legrand, 767 F.3d 
879, 882 (9th Cir. 2014). Counsel failed to provide the petitioner any notice that the Nevada 
Supreme Court had denied Gibbs’s appeal, which caused the petitioner to miss his federal 
habeas filing deadline. Id. In Rudin v. Myles, post-conviction counsel, the same one at issue 
in Gibbs, did nothing but appear at status checks. Rudin v. Myles, 781 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2014). He did not even file a petition for post-conviction relief, causing his client to 
miss both her state and federal statute of limitations. Id. To note, the Ninth Circuit went out 
of its way to demonstrate that the underlying trial ineffectiveness claims were substantial. Id. 
at 1047. Without a federal forum, the petitioner in Rudin would never have the opportunity 
to litigate these substantial claims. 
43  Brown, 331 P.3d at 867. 
44  Id. at 871. 
45  Id. at 874 n.9. 
46  Id. 
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tioners will be left on their own to raise ineffectiveness claims for which they 
are unqualified and ill-prepared to raise. And the performance of post-
conviction counsel remains standardless. 
III.   WHY MARTINEZ MATTERS IN NON-CAPITAL CASES IN NEVADA 
The right to the effective assistance of counsel cannot be overstated.47 But 
like any other constitutional right, this right means nothing without an effective 
mechanism to vindicate that right. The situation before Martinez, while recog-
nizing the right to effective counsel, effectively prevented non-capital defend-
ants from asserting that right. States could follow a simple formula to prevent 
federal review of the effectiveness of defense counsel: assign an attorney for 
the trial and direct appeal, and then either refuse to assign an attorney during 
post-conviction proceedings or assign an attorney who has no obligation to 
meet a certain level of competence. These post-conviction petitions—raising 
only weak claims of ineffective assistance, or no claims at all—would, of 
course, be denied by the state courts. When the defendant finds himself in fed-
eral court, he would find he could not raise his meritorious claims of ineffective 
assistance because these claims would be barred by the procedural default doc-
trine.48  
Martinez repudiated this.49 Without effective post-conviction counsel, “the 
initial-review collateral proceeding . . . may not [be] sufficient to ensure that 
proper consideration was given to a substantial claim.”50 In this regard, Mar-
tinez is less a case about the importance of initial post-conviction counsel than 
it is a recognition that criminal defendants must have a forum to assert their 
right to effective counsel. Initial post-conviction counsel is merely a means to 
that end: if states are not going to provide an adequate forum to litigate the ef-
fectiveness of counsel, then the federal courts will. 
This concern is not merely academic. In at least three Nevada non-capital 
cases, review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims was only possible be-
cause federal courts, applying Martinez, allowed the claims to move forward.51 
Without the benefit of a federal forum, these claims would not ever have been 
considered. Or consider the recent Supreme Court case of Buck v. Davis.52 
There, during a capital sentencing trial, defense counsel presented evidence that 
                                                        
47  See Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012). 
48  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991); see also Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10–
11 (“And if counsel’s errors in an initial-review collateral proceeding do not establish cause 
to excuse the procedural default in a federal habeas proceeding, no court will review the 
prisoner’s claims.”). 
49  Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10–11. 
50  Id. at 14. 
51  See McLaughlin v. Laxalt, No. 15-15847, 2016 WL 6561500, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 
2016); Jones v. Palmer, No. 3:11–cv–00467–MMD–WGC, 2015 WL 10014935, at *2 n.2 
(D. Nev. Feb. 4, 2015); Benson v. Budge, No. 3:05–cv–0464–PMP–VPC, 2013 WL 499033, 
at *5 (D. Nev. Feb. 7, 2013). 
52  Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017). 
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the defendant was more violence prone because he was black.53 Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for a six-justice majority, had little difficulty in concluding 
this was ineffective assistance of counsel.54 However, Buck’s claim would have 
been barred before Martinez: he had not raised the claim in state court until it 
was prohibited by state rules.55 So, in Buck too, but for the availability of a fed-
eral forum, Buck’s meritorious ineffective assistance claim would never have 
been heard.56 
Nevada is undergoing an indigent defense crisis. This problem is exacer-
bated by the state’s inattention to post-conviction proceedings in non-capital 
cases, and the need for effective post-conviction attorneys. Without a proper 
state mechanism for non-capital defendants to litigate the effectiveness of their 
counsel, the role of federal courts—and federal habeas—takes on special im-
portance. For, so long as non-capital defendants cannot meaningfully assert 
their right to effective assistance of counsel in state court, the federal courts 
will be the only available forum. And if the right to effective assistance of 
counsel is to mean anything, it must mean that the federal courts will enforce 
the right, especially when the state courts will not. 
                                                        
53  Id. at 768–69. 
54  Id. at 767–69. 
55  Id. at 770. 
56  Like the petitioner in Buck, Nevada’s capital petitioners also benefit from the protections 
afforded by Martinez in second or successive habeas proceedings. Although Nevada’s capi-
tal petitioners are entitled to the effective assistance of post-conviction counsel in the initial 
post-conviction proceedings, they too have experienced many of the systemic problems with 
Nevada's indigent defense system. See Final Report: Findings and Recommendations, supra 
note 11. Martinez is a powerful tool to protect their constitutional rights as well. 
